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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since an increasing number of firms around the world are being admin- 
istered in a participatory manner, interest in policies geared toward these 
firms is growing.2 Although many advocates stress welfare aspects of worker 
participation in justifying supportive intervention, the question of operational 
efficiency is clearly a crucial and as yet an unresolved one. At present, there 
is little published information on the diverse ways that participatory firms are 
organized, let alone formal modeling or empirical evidence on the relationship 
between worker participation and enterprise productivity. In consequence, 
little is known about the effects of increased participation on corporate per- 
formance or whether the effects themselves vary according to the type of firm 
under consideration and the form of participation. In this paper we focus on 
these issues within the framework of producer cooperatives (PCs) in several 
Western economies. 
In Section 2 we review the economic literature to generate testable hy- 
potheses about the possible productivity effects of worker participation. We 
note that theorists have been unable to determine unambiguously how worker 
participation will affect performance, a failure that highlights the need for 
further theoretical and empirical work. Our aim in Section 3 is to provide 
comparative institutional material on the diverse ways that PCs, one of the 
most important types of participatory firms, have been organized in different 
sectors and countries. The focus is on the scope and nature of PCs in the two 
largest and most dynamic cooperative sectors in the world, those in France 
and Italy, as well as one of those in least good health, the long-established 
British PC sector. We proceed by modifying the theoretical framework to 
take account of institutional differences and then examining the statistical 
relationship between worker participation and enterprise performance. Since 
the same measures of participation are used for different groups of PCs, we 
are able to report comparable estimates for different countries and institutions. 
The study is based on evidence from large enterprise-level data sets, some 
500 firms over 2 years in France, 140 firms over 5 years in Italy, and 24 firms 
over 20 years in Britain. Finally the policy implications of our findings are 
briefly considered. 
At first sight, one m ight be suspicious of conclusions about the effects of 
participation deduced from a data set containing only producer cooperatives. 
For example, the implicit self-selection of workers and managers m ight lead 
to problems in generalizing the results to capitalist firms. This is clearly a 
problem but in our sample it is not as serious as it may seem. The reason is 
that legally many types of firms are cooperatives, including enterprises in 
2 For example, the European Parliament recently published a report from the Mihr Committee 
supporting the notion of cooperation; several European countries have introduced laws requiring 
worker-directors and a Cooperative Bank was established in the United States in 1980. 
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which all workers are participants and companies founded many years ago 
as coops but now owned by nonworkers and run as private companies. This 
diversity allows us to analyze within our data set the effects of varying degrees 
and forms of participation in different sectors and countries and to draw 
conclusions that have some validity beyond the cooperative sector per se.3 
As our research has proceeded, the evidence has also begun to convince us 
that the European cooperative sector is an interesting topic of study in its 
own right. The traditional picture of the coop sector is one of small inefficient 
lirms unable to survive long in the competitive capitalist environment because 
of managerial and financing problems. In fact, in Italy and France there are 
very large, long-established, and successtul cooperative sectors employing more 
people and playing a greater role in the economy than the better known but 
also highly successful Mondragon group in the Basque region of Spain. More- 
over, the cooperative sector in all Western European countries has grown 
significantly in recent years, for example, from about a dozen firms in the 
United Kingdom in 1970 to about 900 in 1984 and from 300 to 1400 firms 
in France over the same period (see Estrin, 1986). This can in large part be 
attributed to government policy and in particular to the creation of diverse 
supporting organizations. It is hoped that our findings will contribute to the 
formulation of further policy guidelines, particularly with respect to the in- 
ternal organization of the PC. 
2. PREDICTIONS FROM ECONOMIC THEORY 
There has been relatively little formal modeling of the relationship between 
enterprise productivity and worker participation in decision-making, profit, 
and ownership of assets. The existing work is not based on rigorous theory 
and we therefore restrict ourselves to surveying the general themes to clarify 
the issues at stake. 
Participation in decision-making, profit, and ownership is hypothesized to 
affect company productivity via the productive skills of the labor force, work- 
ers’ effort or intensity of work, and the firm’s organizational efficiency. Re- 
searchers in the area can be divided into those who think that the effects will 
be positive and those who argue that they will be negative. Each prediction 
is typically made without reference to the nature of the organization or the 
type of participation. On the positive side it is argued that the workers’ pro- 
pensity to stay with the firm and therefore augment their firm-specific human 
capital and productivity is an increasing function of the degree of participation. 
Participation can also be expected to improve the functioning of work groups 
within the firm and to reduce the difficulty of obtaining an optimal labor m ix, 
3 Note also that our sample does not correspond to the traditional image of coops as small and 
often undercapitalized firms. As we observe later, many of the PCs are equivalents of Fortune 
500 companies in the U.S. 
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thereby raising company productivity. Furthermore, a more participatory lirm 
m ight be expected to have superior conflict resolution and therefore fewer 
strikes or work stoppages. In such companies the average labor tenure would 
be longer, and this would generate better incentives for individuals to acquire 
human capital and for firms to train their labor forces. Participation m ight 
also be expected to internalize some of the material and nonmaterial exter- 
nalities associated with the production process. 
Turning to the relationship between participation and effort, there are nu- 
merous reasons why employees in participatory firms m ight be expected to 
work harder. Participation in decision-making, profits, and ownership is likely 
to generate superior labor morale and therefore work quality via both team 
spirit and sharper material incentives for effort. The morale effect may also 
create peer group pressures for lower absenteeism, better workmanship, and 
superior monitoring of effort and quality. Finally, participation may improve 
firms’ overall organizational efficiency, flexibility, and willingness to innovate, 
particularly with respect to production processes. Specifically, one m ight expect 
the better communication implicit in such organizations to facilitate the free 
flow and use of information about ways to improve productivity rising from 
the shop floor, and to reduce workers’ suspicions of new work methods and 
practices.4 
On the negative side, the strongest case is made by Jensen and Meckling 
( 1979), who see participation as always having deleterious effects on produc- 
tivity. Firms providing opportunities for participation in decision-making, 
profits, and ownership are therefore always expected to do worse than other 
enterprises. The pessimists focus on information sharing and joint decision- 
making, but they suggest that these features will lead to poor choices if the 
workers do not have the appropriate expertise, particularly in finance and 
marketing. Inefficiencies may also result from participation in decision-making 
because of problems in group preference formation when workers’ tastes differ. 
Even if this social choice problem can be overcome, it is suggested that par- 
ticipative decision-making wilI be slow and cumbersome. Moreover, if the 
participating workers have inappropriate attitudes to risk, either because par- 
ticipation involves them in holding an inefficient asset portfolio or by tem- 
perament, they will invest less than their capitalist counterparts. 
A second strand of the argument stresses the role of management. If workers’ 
participation entails less power and authority for managers, and if managerial 
input is crucial for corporate performance, then participation will be inversely 
associated with efficiency because of managerial shirking.5 The monitoring 
4 For a more complete discussion of these arguments, see Jones and Svejnar (1985). 
5 Earlier the Webbs (1920) claimed that worker control would cause serious inefficiencies because 
of the alleged inability of a manager to effectively oversee his subordinates who had the power to 
discharge him. 
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argument is also used to support the claim that participation in profits by 
workers will produce inefficiencies (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). It is argued 
that as the labor force grows, each individual will have a stronger incentive 
to shirk, and so shirking will become more difficult and expensive to detect. 
Worker participation is expected to be particularly dysfunctional in large hrms. 
Some authors on the optimistic side have tried to derive specific predictions 
from this general analysis. Vanek ( 1970, 1975) and Horvat (1982) argue that 
PCs have to be structured in particular ways for the full productivity effects 
to be realized. It is organizations that come closest to their highly democratic 
and egalitarian structure that will be expected to perform best. Vanek believes 
that the productivity gains come primarily through workers’ involvement in 
decision-making and sees material incentives, the most important of which 
is profit-sharing, as subordinate. Horvat also stresses genuine worker power, 
though for him participation in ownership, which is discouraged by Vanek, 
may be a practical necessity. Cable and Fitzroy’s ( 1980a,b) conceptual frame- 
work stresses both material and nonmaterial causes and argues that there are 
powerful interactions among the various channels, notably between surplus 
sharing and participation in decision-making. But for Oakeshott (1978; see 
also Clayre, 1980), it is material incentives that matter most; a large individ- 
ually owned capital stake is viewed as essential for producing high productivity. 
The propositions on the pessimistic side tend to be more all-encompassing, 
though managerialists would tend to be particularly suspicious of participation 
in decision-making while property rights analysts would tend to stress the 
negative role of worker capital stakes and of profit sharing. 
The general theoretical literature therefore offers competing hypotheses on 
the direction and scale of the participatory effect, with the further suggestion 
that results may hinge on the organizational structure of the firm. The dom- 
inant test in the literature (for a survey see Jones and Backus, 1977; Cable 
and Fitzroy, 1980a,b; Jones and Svejnar, 1982) focuses on general predictions. 
It involves including a participatory variable in a production function, nor- 
mally assumed to be of Cobb-Douglas form, and testing hypotheses about 
the sign and significance of the included variable. This fails to take account 
of the marked variation in market circumstances, internal organization, and 
mode and degree of participation in different enterprises discussed in the 
following section. In our empirical work, we control for differences in market 
structure and internal organization and allow for differences in production 
technology by testing for the functional form best supported by the data. 
Moreover, we distinguish among three possible channels of participation: in 
profits, in ownership, and in decision-making. 
We therefore examine how differences in the organization of coops across 
countries and sectors affect the direction and scale of the participatory effects. 
Light is cast on the general hypothesis from theory by isolating whether there 
are any common patterns in the direction of particular effects across countries, 
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sectors, industries, and years. We also investigate whether, as more careful 
theorists have suggested, the direction of the participatory effect is sensitive 
to organizational form and to the particular channel and degree of partici- 
pation. The approach is in the spirit of Nelson (1981), who suggests that, 
because most empirical work by economists omits important variables such 
as job satisfaction, one m ight expect participatory effects to differ by firm, 
sector, year, and type of firm. 
3. THE DIVERSITY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COOPERATIVES 
Since our econometric work hinges on the way that cooperative structures 
and choices differ by sector and country, it is important to provide information 
on the varying institutional arrangements as well as stylized facts on the issues 
under consideration. We start by pointing out the substantial differences that 
exist between PCs and their capitalist or state-owned counterparts. A PC is 
an enterprise in which 
(a) many workers are “members” of the firm, where membership is nor- 
mally via individual ownership of stock; 
(b) worker-members participate in control and management of the firm; 
(c) control is usually on the basis of one member-one vote. Where voting 
rights vary directly with stock ownership, there is an absence of concentrated 
stock ownership; 
(d) worker-members share in profits. 
Numerous firms with these characteristics have existed in industrialized 
Western economies, but our attention is concentrated on those PCs which 
are the subject of our statistical analysis.6 The discussion is organized around 
Table 1 which summarizes the comparative statistical information for these 
PCs, and also includes comparative information for Mondragon (Spain) PCs 
and U.S. plywood coops, cases that have received much attention in the lit- 
erature. 
Scope and History 
In Italy, the postwar period saw a phenomenal growth of PCs in two phases, 
between 1945 and 1947 and from 1970 to the present (Jones and Zevi, 1983), 
so that by 198 1 there were almost 20,000 registered PCs. This makes the 
Italian grouping by far the largest in Western industrialized countries, em- 
ploying around 200,000 people. The number of PCs in France grew gradually 
6 For general discussions which provide more detail on other dimensions of PCs-empirical, 
historical, and sociological-see Oakeshott ( 1978), Jones ( 1980), and Thomley ( 198 1). For greater 
detail on specific PCs, see Thomas and Logan ( 1982) on Mondmgon; Gunn ( 1984) Jones ( 1979, 
1984) on U.S. PCs; Jones and Zevi (1983) on Italian PCs; Jones (1982) on British PCs; and 
Batstone (1982) on French PCs. 
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since 1945, reaching around 500 in the 1970s (Estrin and Jones, 1983). There 
was a rapid upsurge, however, after 1977, with the population reaching almost 
700 in 1979 and 1000 in the early 1980s. In providing jobs for about 40,000 
workers, the French PC sector is the second largest in the West. The oldest 
surviving PCs in Britain have been in existence for more than 100 years, but 
no firms in this traditional group have been formed since 1950. Total em- 
ployment in long-established British PCs was about 3400 in 1968 but this 
had been halved by 1980.’ Today the British PC sector is the smallest of the 
five under examination in this paper.8 
While Italian PCs have recently increased their influence in the service 
sector, they are active mainly in construction and manufacturing. They are 
estimated to account for about 8% of the sales in building and construction, 
and their market share is reported to be about 10% in the manufacture of 
pottery, woodwork finishings, glass making, and certain mechanical engi- 
neering activities. French PCs have traditionally been concentrated in con- 
struction, priming, and electrical engineering. These areas were still important 
in the late 197Os, accounting for about 50, 12, and 10% of our sample, re- 
spectively, but their relative significance has been diminished by the emergence 
of three new groupings. In one, people with relatively high qualifications have 
begun to provide diverse professional and cultural services. This consultancy 
grouping is already the second most numerous, accounting for about 15% of 
the sample. The other new groups provide more general services and produce 
mechanical goods, each comprising some 8% of the sample. Traditional British 
PCs have been concentrated in clothing, footwear, and printing? 
’ In this paper we confine our attention to the less vibrant example of contemporary British 
PCs. Other British PCs exist. Many have adopted the industrial common ownership movement 
(ICOM) bylaws and resemble the famous Scott Bader Co. Data for these newer PCs, however, 
arc fragmentary and have not yet been examined in any rigorous way. 
* By comparison, the first U.S. PCs were established in the late 18th century and about 800 
are known to have been formed up to the early 1970s (see Jones, 1979). The number in the best 
known group, the plywood PCs, has recently fallen, but the 1970s witnessed the growth of many 
new PCs, notably in reforestation. The Mondragon (Basque) group of PCs differs markedly from 
other cooperatives. Starting from nothing in the mid- 195Os, an integrated organization of about 
19,000 workers has been created covering diversified economic activities including agriculture, 
retailing, educational institutions, and a bank (see Johnson and Whyte, 1977; Thomas and Logan, 
1982). Already this is the third largest PC sector in the West, providing about 16,000 jobs in 
industrial cooperatives alone. 
9 Most American PCs have been grouped into distinct clusters (Jones, 1977), currently including 
the well-known plywood coops, reforestation PCs, and taxi driver cooperatives. Recently there 
has been significant retrenchment in plywood PCs, but the reforestation PCs which first appeared 
in the 1970s have Ilourisbed In Mondragon, almost one-third of the worker-members work in 
PCs that produce consumer durables, about one-third in intermediate goods and components, 
and one-fifth in the production of capital goods. The other main sectors in which Mondragon 
workers find employment are foundries, forges, and building materials. New British PCs span a 
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The average Italian PC is small, employing fewer than 20 workers. However, 
as the sample data described in Table 1 show, there are also many of consid- 
erable size. For example, during 1975-1978 the 79 PCs in our sample em- 
ployed 3 17 workers on average and generated annual value added of about 
$1.9 m illion. The existence of many large PCs distinguishes the Italian sector 
from others in the West. French PCs are on average small, each providing 
employment for around 50 workers though there is considerable variation 
from branch to branch, ranging on average from only 16 workers in consul- 
tancy to about 60 in construction. Data for 1968 show that on average the 
largest traditional British PCs are in clothing, with footwear PCs being mar- 
ginally bigger than those in printing with respect to labor force, value added, 
and capital stock. But these averages mask considerable variation in the size 
distribution.” 
Internal Structure 
Cooperative bylaws normally stipulate that a certain percentage of enterprise 
surplus must be distributed to workers as a bonus, for example, at least 25% 
in French PCs. Non-worker-members usually share in this allocation. The 
average amount of enterprise surplus allocated to each worker is denoted 
BONUS in Table 1. In 1979 BONUS amounted to $80-$5 10 in French PCs. 
These amounts are considerably higher than those in long-established British 
PCs, ranging from $26 to $58, but below the Italian averages of $750 to $1125 
and the Mondragon figure of more than $1800. 
Only in the U.S. PCs is there an attempt to provide for equality of incomes 
of worker-members, although in Mondragon and Italian PCs there are strict 
lim itations on the permissible income differences that may emerge within a 
firm. No such constraints appear to exist in French and British PCs. 
In almost all Western cooperatives, membership is based on capital own- 
ership. In France, the law requires members to own only one share in the 
firm, but the PCs’ own articles of association typically require an additional 
capital stake. We see in Table 1 that the average worker’s capital stake, des- 
ignated OWN, is higher in the older industries such as construction, electricals, 
mechanicals, and printing ($2800-$3700) and lower in newer ones such as 
services and consulting ($2300-$2400). In Italian PCs, workers cannot hold 
a share greater than $5000, equal to roughly one-half of a worker’s average 
annual income. In practice, actual holdings fall below these maxima, even in 
lo In U.S. plywood PCs, employment averaged 236 in 1982 and their size ranged from 60 to 
500 workers. Reforestation PCS are smaller, with the average PC providing jobs for 39. In the 
main, U.S. PCs have emerged in trades characterized by a high skill content. Newly established 
British coops tend to be tiny, employing fewer than 10 workers on average (Cornforth, 1983). 
Mondragon PCs tend to use more sophisticated technology than elsewhere. As is clear from Table 
1, Mondragon PCs are by far the most capital-intensive group of PCs. 
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larger PCs. As Table 1 shows, the value of OWN was about $1125 in man- 
ufacturing PCs and about $500 in construction PCs, but these are well above 
sums held in long-established British PCs, which are between $100 and $200. ’ ’ 
Worker ownership can also be proxied by the proportion of the individually 
owned member capital in the hands of worker-members, denoted CONTROL 
in Table 1. For French PCs this fraction never falls below the 78% observed 
in consultancy firms and it never rises above the 90% observed in the electricals 
sector. For both French and British PCs, the measure tells a story about the 
intersectoral pattern of effective participation similar to that of the previous 
variable. Data lim itations preclude the calculation of CONTROL for the other 
countries. In Table 1 we also examine the importance of individual worker 
ownership with the variable SHARE which shows the proportion of the firm’s 
assets owned by worker-members. By this measure, worker members in the 
older French PCs have less control than workers in the newer sectors, though 
far more control than workers in the long-established British PCs. Workers 
in Italian PCs also have less influence than the French on this measure. 
Individually owned member shares are paid a lim ited return in French, 
Italian, and British PCs.‘* Shares are repaid at par when members leave and 
if the coop is dissolved then all net assets devolve to a cooperative fund except 
in the United Kingdom, where industrial members share the new assets of a 
dissolved company.13 The bulk of finance is therefore provided by collectively 
owned reserves built up by allocations from the surplus. Sometimes this is 
mandatory, as in France, where a m inimum of 15% must be reinvested. The 
differing importance of reserves is indicated by collective reserves per worker- 
member, denoted RES in Table 1. The undercapitalization of British PCs is 
manifest. Most importantly, Table 1 illustrates the striking dependence on 
collective as compared with individual ownership in all PCs except the French 
consultancy and service sectors. For example, in British printing PCs reserves 
per worker are 16 times as great as individual ownership (RES/OWN = 16). 
By contrast, the ratio in Mondragon is about 1.5. 
PCs rarely borrow on the open market, though they do take loans from 
” However, these values are markedly below ownership stakes held by Mondragon members, 
estimated by Thomas and Logan to be as high as $48,000 for senior workers. For U.S. plywood 
firms, since there is neither an active market in plywood shares nor an accounting system cor- 
responding to the sophisticated internal capital accounts method used in Mondragon, it is difficult 
to establish the average value of worker-members’ capital. Gunn (1984) reports shares in the 
more successful PCs having sold in excess of $100,000. 
I2 In U.S. PCs, dividends are seldom paid on member capital. 
I3 In Mondragon and U.S. plywood PCs the value of an individual member’s stake varies, 
depending on the fortunes of the firm. However, an individual worker in Mondragon can usually 
liquidate his capital account without penalty only upon retirement. And in U.S. plywood PCs, 
an individual worker-member who wishes to realize his equity in the coop must, upon leaving, 
find another worker satisfactory to the remaining workers and with sufficient funds to buy him 
out. 
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specialized financial institutions and, in addition, members often make sub- 
stantial personal loans to their cooperatives. This may represent a further 
measure of workers’ identification with the enterprise and is denoted LEND 
in Table 1. In large Italian PCs the individual worker, attracted in part by tax 
incentives (Jones and Zevi, 1983), loans his lirrn from $1000 in construction 
to $1875 in manufacturing on average, far more than in British PCs ($34- 
$153), U.S. plywood PCs, and Mondragon PCs, though somewhat less than 
in French PCs, particularly the newer ones. For some countries we can control 
for the total amount of debt. In France the proportion of loan capital lent by 
members, denoted LOANS in Table 1, ranges from around 35% of loan capital 
on average in service PCs to almost 60% in the consultancy sector. In the 
United Kingdom, members’ loans are typically a small proportion of debt, 
except for in the footwear sector. 
Though the minimum capital requirements are generally small, not all 
workers choose to become cooperative members and to thereby gain the right 
to participate in corporate decision-making.‘4 MEMB in Table 1 represents 
the proportion of the labor force that chooses to become members and it 
varies considerably from firm to firm. On average in 1968,66% ofthe workers 
were members in British footwear PCs, although the proportion was only 
about 40% in clothing and printing. In French PCs, in only two sectors do 
more than 70% of workers become members, which is slightly below the 
average figure in large Italian PCs. Mondragon membership is required of all 
permanent workers.” 
I4 Legislation governing PCs exists in most European countries and conforms with the principles 
of cooperation laid down by the Inte.mational Cooperative Alliance: one member, one vote; free 
and voluntary membership; and limited remuneration of the underwritten capital. There is no 
state or federal legislation that governs the U.S. cooperatives. Sometimes tbe rules also set limits 
on the membership size. For example, in Italy, while there is no upper limit on the number of 
members, there must be no fewer than 9 and, for PCs that participate in public contracts, 25 
member are needed. Generally, in France, Italy, and Mondragon only workers can be members 
of the primary cooperatives. In traditional British PCs typically there are three classes of members: 
workers, other individuals (particularly former workers), and other societies (particularly retail 
cooperatives, other PCs, and trade unions). 
Is For each PC movement, important differences also exist with respect to the relationship 
between PCs and other parts of the labor movement. The best known and most developed structures 
designed to support primary coops exist in Mondragon (Thomas and Logan, 1982). Of special 
importance is a cooperative bank that exists to serve all PCs in Mondragon. No such institution 
exists to serve another group of PCs and usually there are legal restrictions inhibiting a PC’s 
ability to raise outside financing. For example, in Britain preference shares cannot be. issued. In 
France PCs are served by a national federation and several regional federations and specialist 
associations for building and printing. Cooperation in France is also traditionally well represented 
in both retail trade and agriculture, but there is little effective collaboration between these co- 
operatives and PCs or with other segments of the labor movement (Antoni, 1957). By contrast, 
a major characteristic of the Italian movement is the promotion of close ties; PCs exist as part of 
an integrated cooperative movement. Strong national organizations of cooperatives and consortia 
exist to serve PCs (Jones and Zevi, 1983). By comparison, with experiences elsewhere, the second- 
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4. ESTIMATING FRAMEWORK 
Our empirical work follows the literature in employing an augmented pro- 
duction function framework. Specifically, we estimate equations of the general 
form 
v= wh%xz) (1) 
where Vdenotes value added, Kand L represent the capital and labor inputs, 
respectively, X is a vector of industry- and enterprise-specific variables, and 
2 is a vector of participatory variables. To see how the participatory variables 
enter Eq. (l), consider the Cobb-Douglas case when the effects of participation 
are disembodied. The production function is then 
J/z AK”IL”Z&Z+~X? 
which in a logarithm form become@ 
(2) 
In V=lnA+qlnK+azlnL+yZ+6X. (3) 
The 2 vector comprises proxies for the three categories of worker participation: 
surplus sharing, financial commitment to the firm, and decision-making. For 
France the equations are estimated separately for each sector and the X vector 
contains dummies for the year and for subsectors of construction. In addition, 
to test life-cycle theories, variables for the age of the enterprise are included 
where possible. For Italy and Britain, where our data are in the form of panels, 
we allow for firm-specific tied effects and estimate models which do and do 
not contain firm-specific intercepts. 
An important aim of our analysis is to identify the most appropriate form 
of the production function, in case the effects attributed to the participation 
variables, when a single functional form is imposed, are in fact due to m is- 
specification of technology. We therefore employ three forms of production 
technology: the generalized Cobb-Douglas (CD) function, Kmenta’s (1967) 
approximation to the constant elasticity of substitution (CES), and the tran- 
scendental logarithmic (translog) function. In each case we select the pro- 
duction function best supported by the data. In particular, denoting firms by 
i, the time period in years by t (t = 1, 2, . . . ,), and the residual by I.C, we 
estimate 
In I’, = (~0 + a, ln Kit + cYJn Lit + ~y3 Zit + (YJit + pit (4) 
In vii = @o + &ln Kil + ,&ln Lit + 83 2, + pbB4xit + &#n(&/Lit)]* + Pit (5) 
/third-degree structures that exist to serve either U.S. or British primary PCs are primitive. While 
U.S. plywood and reforestation PCs, for example, do belong to federations, the nature and scope 
of these structures and the range of services that they provide are very limited. 
” For a fuller exposition of this estimating framework, see Jones and Svejnar (1985). 
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In Vi* = 70 + y iln Kit + y&n Li* + 73 Zit + y4Xil 
-I- ‘Ys[ln LiJ2 + y&n Kit]’ + y&l &ln Lit •I- Pit (6) 
and we use F tests as well as Davidson and MacKinnon’s (198 1) J test to 
select the most appropriate functional form. 
In the following section we report the results from regressions based on 
common sets of functional forms, specifications, and sets of participatory and 
control variables for the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. The aim is to 
search for common patterns and highlight intercountry differences which could 
be associated with national characteristics such as the existence or absence of 
supporting organizations. We have reported elsewhere on intercountry studies 
in which we relax the constraints imposed by the need for intercountry com- 
parability, for example, by using CONTROL as a participatory variable for 
French PCs (see Estrin and Jones, 1983; Jones and Svejnar, 1985). 
In view of the superior robustness of ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates 
against specification errors relative to simultaneous equations methods, we 
first report OLS results. However, since endogeneity of regressors may be a 
problem in our functional specification, especially with respect to Z, we also 
report the main estimates from specifications based on instrumental vari- 
ables (IVs). 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Our econometric work is based on the three enterprise-level data sets de- 
scribed in Table 1, covering around 500 French PCs in 1978 and 1979, 150 
Italian PCs for 1976 to 1980, and some 50 long-established British PCs for 
5-year intervals between 1948 and 1968. The main OLS results are reported 
in Table 2 and variable definitions are contained in the Appendix. 
The OLS estimates point to differences in the preferred functional form. 
In the United Kingdom, the estimated Cobb-Douglas and disembodied 
translog production functions overwhelmingly reject the firm-specific fixed- 
effects specification in favor of the one with a single intercept. In the latter 
specification the disembodied Cobb-Douglas form dominates CES and tran- 
slog. For Italian PCs, however, fixed-effect models are superior and in man- 
ufacturing translog dominates Cobb-Douglas and CES. Finally, in France, 
while we are unable to test for the fixed-effects specification, we find that the 
translog form dominates Cobb-Douglas and CES in all sectors except con- 
struction and electricity. 
To test whether the existing participatory schemes have any effect on per- 
formance we use an F test on the joint exclusion of the five participatory 
variables from the augmented production function. In all 10 cases across the 
three countries this leads us to reject the hypothesis that the various forms of 
participation, taken together, do not affect productivity. Moreover, in the case 
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are positive, the results strongly support the hypothesis that participation in- 
creases enterprise output. However, in the case of all three countries one finds 
some coefficients to be statistically insignificant and in the two Italian sectors 
the significant coefficients on the participatory variables display both positive 
and negative signs. The results hence point to the significance of the produc- 
tivity effects of participation, but they also indicate that the effects are sensitive 
to the form of participation. In terms of the ongoing debate, our findings 
definitely contradict the entirely pessimistic propositions of, for example, Jen- 
sen and Meckling ( 1979), and suggest that some forms of worker participation 
tend to improve productive performance. 
When one examines the productivity effects of the individual participatory 
schemes, several interesting patterns emerge. The most striking result concerns 
the profit-sharing variable, BONUS, whose estimated coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant in all 11 cases, a remarkable degree of consistency 
across sectors and countries. 
Turning to the three proxies for workers’ financial commitment, OWN, 
LEND, and RES, we find that OWN (individual capital ownership per worker) 
has a positive and significant effect in all six French sectors as well as in Italian 
manufacturing. Moreover, in Italian construction the estimated coefficient is 
positive and close to being significant at conventional statistical significance 
test levels. However, in the United Kingdom, where individual ownership 
stakes are typically very low, the coefficient on OWN is found to be statistically 
insignificant. 
It is remembered from Table 1 that, in general, workers’ stakes in the firm 
via short-term loans are greater than those via individual ownership. However, 
the coefficient on the LEND variable is insignificant in all the regressions. 
The average size of individual member loans to the PC hence appears to be 
completely unrelated to the firm’s productive efficiency. 
The effect of average collective ownership of the hrm’s assets by worker 
members, RES, varies across countries. It is significantly negative in the two 
Italian sectors and not significantly different from zero in France and in the 
United Kingdom. 
The remaining element of the 2 vector is worker participation in decision- 
making, measured by MEMB. This is found to enhance corporate productivity 
significantly in Italian manufacturing and in all the French sectors, but the 
coefficient is insignificant in Italian construction and in the three British in- 
dustries. The insignificance of the MEMB coefficient in the Italian construction 
sector may be caused by data lim itations. In contrast to manufacturing, where 
data on current (active) members could be used to construct MEMB, the 
MEMB variable in construction includes both the current and the retired 
worker-members. The British results clearly stand out and once again raise 
the question of why one finds so many insignificant effects in this system of 
PCs. However, it should be noted that the British results are sensitive to the 
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choice of the relevant proxy variable. When the proportion of the board of 
directors that is worker-members is used as an alternative measure of worker 
participation in the British PCs, the variable enters the Cobb-Douglas pro- 
duction function with a positive and significant coefficient. 
If we briefly consider the OLS results by country, we find participatory 
effects to be the strongest and most common in Italy and France, countries 
with relatively high average degrees of participation, strong cooperative tra- 
ditions, and well-organized supporting institutions. In the United Kingdom, 
where the average levels of participation are much lower, worker cooperative 
traditions are less generally established, and the supporting organizations are 
much weaker, the effects of participation on performance, though positive 
when significant, are few and far between. 
The data sets provide only lim ited support for the life-cycle hypothesis 
about productive performance. The longevity of the firm (LONG) could be 
measured in all the French sectors, in Italian manufacturing, and in the British 
printing, clothing, and footwear samples. Entering this variable quadratically 
produces the expected concave and initially increasing productivity profile in 
the Italian and French PCs but the relationship is statistically significant in 
only the former case. In the British PCs the estimated life-cycle profile is flat 
in clothing and is downward sloping, although convex, in printing and foot- 
wear. Moreover, even the Italian finding is not overwhelmingly supportive of 
the hypothesis since the estimated productivity decline sets in only at the age 
of 161 years. 
The usefulness of the IV estimates that we have produced to overcome the 
potential endogeneity of regressors depends critically on the availability of 
suitable instruments. This turned out to be no problem in the case of the 
Italian and British data sets where a sufficiently long panel exists for each 
firm. The correlation between the original regressors and the exogenous in- 
struments is high and the estimated IV coefficients are very similar to the 
OLS ones in these two countries.” 
The French PCs data cover only 2 years and the predictive power of the 
available instrumental variables is rather lim ited. The resulting IV estimates 
differ in several respects from their OLS counterparts and are therefore pre- 
sented in detail in Table 3. The most striking finding is that the coefficient 
on BONUS changes from being highly significant in Table 2 to being insig- 
” For instance, the IV estimates (absolute t statistics) based on a disembodied Cobb-Douglas 
specification are as follows. Italian manufacturing: BONUS 1.632 (7.19), OWN 1.584 (3.90), 
LEND 0.065 (0.34), RES -0.312 (3&i), and MEMB 0.529 (1.82); Italian construction: BONUS 
6.475 (6.41), OWN 9.265 (6.01), LEND 5.827 (6.68), RES -0.250 (5.43), and MEMB -0.798 
( 1.35); British printing: BONUS 0.0048 (2.576), OWN -0.0040 ( 1.342), LEND 0.002 1 (0.220) 
RES -0.0003 (1.385), and MEMB 0.0001 (1.341). These estimates are based on instrumental 
variable equations with indexes of product prices, capital goods prices, material prices, and firm- 
specific dummy variables interacted with time serving as instruments. 
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nificant in all but one case, printing, in Table 3. The MEMB variable displays 
positive coefficients throughout and in three of the six cases they are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. OWN registers two positive and statistically sig- 
TABLE 3 
IV ESTIMATES OF PRODUCTIVITY EFFECX OF WORKER PARTICIPATION IN FRENCH PCs 
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Note. The instruments used were regional dummies, time dummies, the average age of workers 
and managers, the mode of creation of the firm, interest costs on internal and external loans, the 
proportion of equity held privately, and the debt/equity ratio. 
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nificant coefficients, while LEND and RES each record one positive and one 
negative significant coefficient. The IV estimates are hence less conclusive 
and they highlight the positive productivity effect of workers’ participation 
in management and, to a slightly lesser extent, of individual worker ownership 
of firms’ assets. In view of the fact that adequate instruments could not be 
found for the French PCs, these results ought to be treated as tentative. With 
longer panel data being available for the French PCs in the relatively near 
future, it will be possible to provide more conclusive insights into the pro- 
ductivity effects within this PC sector. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Our results indicate that the productivity effects of various forms of worker 
participation differ markedly from one institutional setting to another. How- 
ever, in general they support the prediction that the overall effect of the various 
participatory schemes observed in Western producer cooperatives is positive. 
In the OLS regressions, the positive effect is found most uniformly with respect 
to profit sharing and, to a slightly lesser extent, to individual capital (share) 
ownership by workers and participation in decision-making as measured by 
the proportion of workers who are members. Individual worker loans to the 
coop are not related to performance while collective capital ownership exhibits 
an insignificant or a negative productivity effect. In Italy and in the United 
Kingdom, where suitable instruments are available, the IV estimates strongly 
resemble their OLS counterparts. In France, where the predictive power of 
the available instruments is low, the IV results differ from the OLS ones and 
the IV results highlight the positive productivity effects of worker participation 
in decision-making and of individual capital ownership by workers. 
Our general findings thus support the proponents of participatory schemes 
rather than their critics. The results suggest that, if higher productivity is the 
goal, PCs should provide for substantial sharing of profits and capital own- 
ership by individual workers together with worker participation in decision- 
making.‘* Collective ownership of assets ought to be avoided unless consid- 
erations other than productivity strongly justify its existence. 
These broad policy conclusions must be tempered by the acute need for 
additional empirical research in this area. The comparative nature of our 
study highlights the diversity of findings across countries and economic sectors. 
The fact that the estimated effects are very significant in Italy and France and 
relatively insignificant in the United Kingdom points to the desirability of 
performing future analyses of the relevant institutional factors that differ con- 
” See, however, Svejnar’s (1982b) findings of virtually no significant productivity effects of 
codetermination in West Germany. 
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siderably across the individual settings. We hope that our attempt to identify 
some of these factors in Section 2 of this paper are helpful in this future effort. 
APPENDIX: THE DATA AND THE VARIABLES 
The Data 
The French data were gathered by a single agency (SCOP) to which most 
French PCs belong. The agency uses systematic procedures in gathering data. 
The data cover about 600 firms existing in 1978 and 1979. More than 90% 
of the observations are for firms in relatively homogeneous industrial group- 
ings: construction, consultancy, electrical engineering, and services. 
The Italian data were gathered in a survey by the Lega Nazionale delle 
Cooperative (Lega), the organization to which most federated Italian PCs 
belong. The agency used systematic procedures in gathering data. Annual 
data were collected during 1975-1980 for individual PCs which had sales in 
excess of $1 million in at least 1 year during this period. While some PCs 
barely exceed this cutoff, others are much larger. For example, the largest PC, 
CMC Ravenna, had sales exceeding $120 million in 1978 and ranked as the 
178th largest firm in Italy. More than 600 observations are available for large 
Italian PCs in manufacturing and construction. 
Data on British PCs are for 1948- 1968 and arc available at 5-year intervals. 
Measures of valued added, capital, labor, and incentives are derived from 
data on individual PCs held by the Research Department of the Cooperative 
Union, Manchester. These data are abstracted from annual returns that so- 
cieties make to the Cooperative Union. Measures of participation are derived 
directly, either from annual returns made by individual PCs to the Cooperative 
Union or from a similar report that, because of registration under the Industrial 
and Provident Societies Acts, societies are required to make on an annual 
basis to the Registrar of Friendly Societies. 
Data on Spanish PCs are taken from Thomas and Logan ( 1982) and Camp 
bell et al. (1977) which, in turn, are typically derived from data supplied by 
the Caja Laboral Popular. Data on U.S. PCs are taken from Gunn (1984). 
The Variables 
V = value added = total labor costs + total capital costs + surplus 
(= cost0 lavoro totale + oneri fin. e int. passivi + risultato 
d’esercizio = valeur adjout&). 
K = capital = fixed assets at historical value (= immobiliz techniche 
or immobilisations nettes). 
L = labor = number of workers = Lx + L, (= lavorati fnsi = effectif 
moyen des salaries). 
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Lx = worker-members (= soci fissi = effectif societaires salari~%). 
L, = non-member-workers (= ausiliari. fissi). 
MEMB = proportion of the workforce that is members = LJL. 
SURPLUS = surplus distributed to workers as a participation bonus. 
BONUS = average surplus distributed per worker = surplus/L (where 20) 
(= risultato d’esercizio/L = dotation a la participation/L). 
OWN = average capital stake per worker-member = member capital/ 
Lx (= capital sociale/L = capital social associb sah&/L,). 
LEND = average loan capital per worker-member = member loan cap 
ital/L, (= prestito soci/LX = comptes courants associes/L,). 
RES = average collectively owned reserves per worker-member = col- 
lective reserves/L, (= fondi riservall, = total fonds propres 
collectifs/l,). 
CONTROL = proportion of total member capital owned by worker-members. 
SHARE = proportion of total assets owned by worker-members. 
LOANS = proportion of loans applied by worker-members. 
LONG = longevity = number of years that a l%rn has been in existence. 
Since all workers share in the firm’s profits, BONUS is defined as profits 
distributed to the labor force per worker, rather than per member. While 
BONUS is available for French and British PCs, for Italian PCs we must use 
profits per worker, which is not an ideal measure of the amount actually 
distributed as income and the labor force. However, profits per worker tend 
to be roughly proportional to the actual worker bonuses. MEMB, the ratio 
of members to workers, is available everywhere except for the Italian con- 
struction industries where, since data do not exist on working vs nonworking 
(mostly retired) members, the numerator of MEMB is defined as the total 
number of coop members. An analysis of the Italian manufacturing data 
suggests that the discrepancy between working members and all members is 
not substantial. 
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